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"I Think the 
Unions Beat Me" 
The 1995 Kentucky Governor's Race 
• Michael Matuszak 
The political pundits were almost universal in agreement: Republican 
Larry Forgy would win the governor's race and end a 24-year drought 
of Republicans in the governor's mansion. Forgy, Ronald Reagan's state 
campaign manager in both the 1980 and 1984 races, had reached out 
to the far Right in hopes of insuring his victory. Throughout the cam-
paign, Forgy emphasized conservative "family values" and a belief "in 
the natural family order where the man works and the woman stays 
home and raises the kids." He said, "It's what the people want and what 
they will get if I am elected governor." Speaking to gatherings of Chris-
tian Right groups such as the Freedom Heritage Forum, Forgy said, "If 
people such as yourselves do not take control of this country, people 
who disagree with you will be glad to run it for you." 
Some of the "people who disagreed" and threatened Forgy's defini-
tion of control were the organized workers of Kentucky. Throughout 
the campaign, Forgy emphasized his anti-labor agenda and voiced strong 
support for right-to-work legislation, pro-employer reform of workers' 
compensation, and opposition to a prevailing wage law. He opposed 
collective bargaining for public employees saying, "If you think state gov-
ernment is stagnant today. . . it would be doubly so with an overlay of 
union organization." 
• Mike Matuszak is a labor educator at the Center for Labor Education and Research 
at the University of Kentucky. 
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Instead of marginalizing labor unions, however, Forgy's anti-labor 
posture "put labor issues on the front burner," according to Morgan 
Bayless, COPE Director of the Kentucky State AFL-CIO. In this cli-
mate, Democratic candidate Paul Patton offered a clear alternative and 
actively sought labor's endorsement early in the campaign. With the 
lines so clearly drawn, organized labor might have run a typical politi-
cal campaign, but the 1995 election was not typical. It was the first gov-
ernor's race conducted since the 1992 adoption of a new campaign 
finance law that aimed to limit spending. Labor was faced with new chal-
lenges in offering support to their pro-labor candidate. 
Under the new law, each candidate had to limit spending to no more 
than $1.8 million in order to receive a state subsidy. This spending limit 
included money spent by outside organizations on campaigning beyond 
their membership. Organized labor was faced with the question of how 
it could make a difference in such an important campaign without mak-
ing monetary or in-kind contributions to the candidate. This question 
goes to the heart of the dilemma that campaign finance reform poses 
for a progressive labor movement. On one hand, a progressive labor 
movement needs to support a truly democratic political process in which 
access to money does not determine access to political power. On the 
other hand, the movement needs to be able to support candidates who 
will defend the rights of workers and organized labor. 
The Kentucky election is one in which organized labor grappled with 
this dilemma and discovered that the democratic tools of education, 
coalition building, and organizing, which are the keys to building a 
strong labor movement, can also play a key role in winning elections. 
HOW THE ELECTION WAS WON 
Rather than follow the traditional practice of concentrating on con-
tributions to a Democratic candidate, resources were dedicated to edu-
cating and "mobilizing union members across the state. Labor unions 
had wide latitude to run campaigns among their members. 
By continually emphasizing the importance of defeating right-to-
work legislation, working for prevailing wages, and defending worker 
compensation, the labor movement ensured that these issues remained 
central to the debate. Such a keen focus on the concerns of working peo-
ple also helped to avoid any waffling by the Democratic candidate. In 
the pages of the Farm Bureau newspaper, Patton reiterated his support 
of collective bargaining as the most effective means for all workers to 
communicate with employers. Carl Dowell, UAW 862 president, said 
that Patton "stuck to his guns. He didn't sugar coat his views or hedge 
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on his position." 
For the AFL-CIO this was more than a governor's race. According 
to Bayless, they "looked at it as a [preview] of where Kentucky [would] 
stand in the presidential race and in the congressional districts that 
Republicans captured or nearly won last year. It had so many far-reach-
ing consequences for our next election. We just had to make sure the 
turnout was there, and that the membership was excited and stayed excited." 
Getting Patton to the governor's office was a long process that first 
involved building a labor coalition in the greater Louisville area of Jef-
ferson County, and then launching an unprecedented statewide effort 
coordinated by the National and State AFL-CIO. 
THE JEFFERSON COUNTY LABOR COALITION AND CAMPAIGN 
Labor efforts in Jefferson County were critical to any hope of elec-
toral success. The county is the most heavily populated in Kentucky and 
has the highest concentration of union members in the state. To win 
the race, Patton had to win Jefferson County by enough votes to over-
come the rural support of the GOP. In addition to the efforts of the 
national and state AFL-CIO, a coalition of unions spearheaded the Jef-
ferson County campaign. 
Jerry Vincent, business agent and secretary-treasurer of Teamsters 
Local 783, was a key player in coordinating the work of the labor coali-
tion that helped deliver the vote. The Teamsters had formed the coali-
tion the previous year to protest a decision by the United Way (a major 
recipient of Teamster and union donations) to hire a non-union con-
tractor for a building project. Coordinating efforts with the central labor 
council and the Building Trades, the Teamsters sponsored a meeting 
and invited trade unionists in the area to join together and challenge 
the United \yay. The unions even met with bankers to discuss the pos-
sibility of starting their own fund, recognizing that while "poor people 
need help" the rights of workers should not be neglected. In response, 
the United Way revised its criteria for contracting the job and a union 
contractor was selected. 
Analyzing the United Way dispute, Vincent believes it provided area 
unions with a "focus point" and led them to realize "[they] could do 
something." Beyond the good feelings generated by the victory, the 
United Way dispute brought together AFL-CIO affiliates and non-
affiliates. After the dispute, the unions agreed to keep the coalition 
together in a loose form and meet when a problem arose. 
The gubernatorial primary race presented just such a "problem." 
When State Senate President John Eck Rose, a Democratic candidate 
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for governor, came out in favor of right-to-work legislation the group 
responded. While support for right-to-work was expected from the 
Republican camp, "it was the first time the same issue came up twice 
[from both Democrats and Republicans]" according to Teamster rep-
resentative Vincent. Right-to-work gave the unions a real issue, some-
thing they could relate to, and one from which the "Christian Coalition 
could not pull us away." At a meeting hosted by the Teamsters, Vin-
cent told representatives of the various area unions that they must 
"focus on one thing—Paul Patton." Labor officials believed it was impor-
tant to get Patton, the labor backed candidate for governor, selected as 
the Democratic candidate in the primary, without a runoff. The task 
was to deliver the labor vote in a decisive primary victory by maintain-
ing a solid labor front (something which had been problematic in the 
past) and generating momentum for the uphill fall campaign. 
To help fasten Kentucky develop economically, [Republican] Forgy 
wants to "wind down seme et the problems tbat the organized labor 
mentality imposes on the area*.." . ... _ 
Louisville Courier Journal 
The effort began with a small cell of union leaders. Vincent and oth-
ers labeled the existing coalition as inadequate, and initial efforts were 
devoted to building an organization through regular meetings and 
expanded participation. While the unions were each free to do their 
own thing, they agreed on a common strategy to get Patton elected by 
concentrating on simple bread-and-butter labor issues. Individual unions 
used a variety of methods to educate their own members. For exam-
ple, the Teamsters, with an estimated 20,000 members in Kentucky, set 
up an 800 number so that over-the-road drivers could call in for cam-
paign updates. 
John McCarty, a Teamster representative assigned to work on the cam-
paign full time, observed that the campaign "relied less on pollsters" 
and instead "listened to what our members were saying." In his words, 
"we felt the pulse of the campaign through our members... Our mem-
bers were a barometer." Late in the campaign, however, the labor issues 
were played out, and McCarty observed that "right-to-work only plays 
so long and the message becomes boring." To keep the campaign ener-
gized and to reach the families of union members and retirees* they 
broadened their approach. They noticed that union retirees, many of 
whom belonged to fishing clubs, were concerned about a GOP proposal 
to sell four state-owned lakes. Fliers were sent out addressing the lake 
issue and it struck a nerve. Working as volunteers, union retirees proved 
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invaluable in the campaign. McCarty believes that through the efforts 
of the labor coalition "everybody had an issue [and] a reason to vote." 
THE AFL-CIO STATEWIDE CAMPAIGN 
The organizing campaign in Jefferson County was a success. And 
after the primary the unions knew they could tackle the general elec-
tion with the same simple strategy: educate and mobilize. Approxi-
mately six weeks before the November election, six labor campaign 
coordinators (one each from the Kentucky AFL-CIO, CWA, UFCW, 
and two from the regional AFL-CIO) were each assigned to a specific 
Congressional district to begin work in the field. First, coordinators 
were instructed to meet with every local union president in their elec-
tion district. For most, this meant making more than 50 contacts. Local 
union presidents were asked to leaflet their workplace by October 13 
with a simple flier comparing Patton's and Forgy's views on organized 
labor. 
Next, every local union president was asked to send a letter to each 
member of their union encouraging their support for Paul Patton. COPE 
Director Morgan Bayless explained that "our research shows that rank-
and-file union members respect the opinions of their local union pres-
idents and regard them as reliable sources of information." On October 
16, the effort was turned into a media event in a number of locations 
throughout the state when local union presidents converged on post offices 
carrying bags loaded with letters to their members. In Louisville, 41 
local union presidents attended a press conference at the main post 
office bringing with them an estimated 60,000 pieces of mail. Across 
the state, it is estimated, that more than 100,000 letters were mailed 
that week. 
In the last 10 days before the election, the State AFL-CIO organized 
"precinct walks" in selected communities. State AFL-CIO Education 
Director, Dewey Parker, one of the campaign coordinators, said it was 
the first time the Kentucky AFL-CIO had engaged in such an effort inde-
pendent of the Democratic Party. The precinct walkers consisted of 
local union officers and rank-and-file members who volunteered their 
time. Sophisticated statistical data, provided by the National AFL-CIO, 
identified key precincts of persuadable voters to be targeted. Precinct 
walkers were provided with fliers and a list of union households. Because 
changes in campaign law prohibited unions from coordinating efforts 
with the Democratic Party and communicating with the general pub-
lic, precinct walkers only knocked on the doors of union households. 
AFL-CIO officials report that the names and addresses provided by the 
National were accurate, and based on the turn out and vote counts in 
98 Labor Research Review #24 
targeted precincts, the tactic was an overwhelming success. 
To keep the momentum going, the state Fed faxed regular editions 
of its Campaign Alert to 125 local unions across the state. The Alert 
contained information on events, activities, and ideas to energize local 
efforts. The updates kept the locals plugged into the campaign and 
were widely circulated and posted. Many locals duplicated the mes-
sages and passed them out in workplaces upon receipt. The AFL-CIO 
estimates that the locals distributed 480,000 fliers to labor council and 
local union members. 
A phone bank organized by the national AFL-CIO made over 150,000 
phone calls to union members during the campaign and coordinated 
specific follow-up mailings based on caller responses. The campaign 
reached a fever pitch when Richard Trumka, the recently elected sec-
retary-treasurer of the national AFL-CIO, attended several rallies the 
weekend before the election. In a report summarizing the various activ-
ities, AFL-CIO officials said that, "In this election we had more union 
volunteers than in any campaign that we have ever worked. Most of the 
credit must be given to Paul Patton, because he did not run from us. 
He publicly stated he was our candidate. This helped us more than we 
could ever say." 
THE VICTORY 
The mobilization in Jefferson County and across the state by the 
AFL-CIO paid off. After a surprisingly easy primary victory, Patton car-
ried Jefferson County by less than 25,000 votes in the November elec-
tion. The statewide margin of victory was less than 22,000 votes. In a 
post-election interview the unsuccessful Republican candidate Forgy 
said, "I think the unions beat me and I'm not too proud to say it. They 
had every reason to fear me. . . They feared me; they came after me; 
and there is no question that they cost me more than 20,000 votes. . . 
I carried Kentucky and they carried Jefferson County." 
According to Vincent, the coalition represented the first time unions 
had gotten together since 1957. McCarty attributes this to the effect 
of campaign reform laws. He believes the law forced a "separation of 
the labor movement from the state Democratic Party." Rather than 
contribute funds to the party, the labor movement spent its money 
internally. McCarty notes that "the money did not go to road pavers," 
but was used instead to educate and mobilize the membership. The cam-
paign itself was not about brilliant strategizing but rather the result of 
basic organizing skills and hard work. In Vincent's words, in the begin-
ning of the campaign "we felt like a blind hog rooting for an acorn, but 
in retrospect it was a good campaign." 
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LESSONS FROM THE CAMPAIGN 
A few important lessons can be gained from the 1995 governor's race. 
First, while the changes in campaign finance law forced unions to take 
a fresh look at how they participate in elections, the upset victory clearly 
shows that the labor movement still possesses significant political power. 
And, in Kentucky, this power may be more effectively used when mobi-
lized independent of the Democratic Party. Second, union members 
can be more effective communicators than party operatives on the 
bread-and-butter labor issues that were the primary focus of the cam-
paign. Finally, the results of the election may also send a message to 
aspiring candidates: If you present a clear alternative to the anti-labor 
attacks of conservatives and have the courage to stick to your position, 
you can attract working class votes. • 
LRR FOCUS 
On the heels of the Democratic victory in the 1995 Kentucky Governor's race, 
the Kentucky Republican Parly filed a complaint with the state Registry of Elec-
tion Finance. The complaint alleges collusion between the Democratic Party, 
the Patton campaign, various unions, and the A. Philip Randolph Institute (APRI), 
a Black voter education group based in Louisville, Kentucky. The Lexington Her-
ald-Leader reported that "outside groups with ties to the Democrats, including 
unions and the A. Philip Randolph Institute... spent at least $300,000 on the 
election. Most of the spending was in Jefferson County," which Patton carried 
by a large margin. The GOP has made unsubstantiated claims that collusion 
enabled the Patton campaign to skirt the election reform spending limits. 
The 1995 campaign was the first conducted under the new regulations which 
imposed spending limits and lower maximum contributions—changes which 
the Republicans opposed. The effort of unions and other organizations to edu-
cate and turn out voters were paramount in the Patton victory. A primary target 
of the Republican charges are the activities of the A Philip Randolph Institute. 
On election day, close to 600 mainly Black youths were paid by the state Demo-
cratic Party and APRI to hand out leaflets and offer voters rides to the polls in 
predominately Black neighborhoods. APRI reports that it paid between 200 to 
400 teenagers $20 to $35 a day to pass out fliers and encourage voter turnout 
on and before election day. On election day it also provided 26 vans equipped 
with loudspeakers to transport voters to and from polling sites. APRI insisted that 
it engaged in non-partisan efforts to increase the vote in Black precincts. The 
Lexington Herald-Leader reports that so far "the registry has turned up no smok-
ing gun—such as an incriminating letter or telephone record—to indicate that 
Patton's campaign colluded with anyone." • 
